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1 Introduction
In most vertical differentiation models, the quality of the products is a
known variable and enters the utility function as a deterministic variable.
Nevertheless, some récent contributions, Krishna and Winston (2000) and
Grilo and Wauthy (2000), interpret the quality issue as a probability that
the product "delivers to the consumer the satisfaction he expected to enjoy".
Thèse articles study the impact of quality uncertainty on market structure.
In this paper, we restrict their quality concept to the "survival probability"
of the product in order to focus on the quality demand function. In fact, for
a wide class of products such as durable goods, the consumers often décide
to buy more expensive products in order to be "more sure' that they will
not break down (or last longer). The survival probability of a product being
one important dimension of its quality, demand for quality crucially dépends
on the risk aversion that characterizes the consumers' préférences.
In this paper, we fill this gap in the literature. We use the framework
of vertical differentiation models to analyze the conséquences of buyers' risk
aversion.1 In the discrète version of this class of models, two kinds of con
sumers are distinguished : the high valuation and the low valuation ones.
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Even though Qrilo and Wauthy {2000) hâve used a continuous distribution for consumers' risk aversion,
they use certainty équivalent, which does not permit to capture a risk aversion effect on demand for quality.
10911 o Recherches économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(1), 2004
Naturally, the high valuation consumera are characterized by a higher wil-
lingness to pay for the good. The seller cannot observe this characteristic,
which constitues a private information of the buyers, and he/she must there-
fore introduce a second-order price discrimination in order to extract (more)
consumers' surplus.
Intuitively, we could imagine that if high valuation consumers are
more risk averse than the low valuation ones, they would like to buy the hi
gher quality product in order to reduce the probability that the good breaks
down.2 So, in a vertical differentiation model, this second source of heteroge-
neity between consumers should a priori not change the incentive problem
and the high valuation incentive constraints may be relaxed. Contrary to
this intuition, we prove in the section 2 that if high valuation consumers
are also more risk averse, then the traditional second-order discrimination
mechanism may paradoxically be disturbed by a risk-aversion effect. We
conclude in the third section.
2 Uncertainty around demand for quality and risk
aversion
In the first subsection, we use the framework of Mussa and Rosen (1978)
and we explain that. in their model, quality can also be interpreted as a pro
bability. In the second subsection, we study the incentive constraints when
high valuation consumers are more risk averse. We make the link between
consumer's demand for quality and self-protection theory propounded by
Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) in the third subsection.
2.1 Quality and probability of survival in a vertical
differentiation model
Consider the simplest discrète version of the Mussa-Rosen vertical differen
tiation model with two types of consumers, characterized by différent levels
of their taste parameter : tf, with i = {H, L} and tiH > tiL. The proportions
of high and low valuation consumers are respectively A and 1 — A. In their
model, consumers are assumed to be risk neutral, and the consumer i utility
function is :
Ui = tiiq - P (1)
where q and P are respectively the quality level of the product and the price
paid to the seller. We remark that this utility function can be interpreted as
2 Unfortunately, analysis which deal with quality do not consider that quality is an increasing function of th8
survival probability of the product. If the reader wants to be convinced by this intuition, after explaining that
quality increases the survival probability, he can ask his colleagues the following question : "For a same
taste, if you are more risk averse than me, will you buy higher quality ?" Most of the time, the answer is
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an expected utility if q is viewed as a probability that the product générâtes
a satisfaction di and while with a probability 1 - q it générâtes 0. Indeed,
Ui=q{di-P) + {l-q){-P) (2)
which is équivalent to (1). Since the quality becomes the survival probability
of the product, in the good state of the world, the product générâtes a
satisfaction #,- less the price paid, whereas in the bad state the product
breaks down and the consumer's utility is simply the opposite of the price
paid.
The seller's problem is to maximize his profit. For simplicity. we as
sume that his cost function3 is c(q) = \. Since the seller cannot observe the
consumers' type, he/she must offer two contracts for which the consumers
self-select according to their taste parameter.
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Where ICH and ICL are the incentive constraints associated to types H
and L, and PCH and PCL the usual participation constraints. The second-
order price discrimination schemes are well-known : the high valuation con
sumers incentive constraints (ICH) and the low valuation consumers par
ticipation constraints (PCL) are binding. Then, the second-best contracts
H (P) d L ()
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for high valuations consumers, and
p _
L
3 We use this assumption in order to be as close as possible to the Mussa-Rosen framework. However.
Deneckere and Me Afee (1996) give several examples for durable goods where low quality is more costly.
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for the low valuations ones.
High valuation consumers receive the first-best quality level whereas
the quality is reduced for the low valuation consumers in order to guarantee
the high valuation incentive constraints.
2.2 Risk aversion heterogeneity between consumers and
second-order price discrimination
Now. assume that the high valuation consumers are more risk averse than
the low valuation ones. This assumption seems to be realistic4 and only
implies that the group of consumers who hâve a higher willingness to pay
for the product are also more afraid that the product breaks down.
We consider that risk aversion of the high valuation consumers can be
represented by a concave transformation (k) of U (Pratt (1964), Kihlstrom-
Mirman (1974)). Hère, we restrict our attention to a quadratic utility func-
tion : V{W) = E [W - 7W2] where the degree of risk aversion is captured
by 7-5 Then, the expected utility of high valuation agents who pay a price
P to obtain a quality q is :
VH =
= UH-1 (qti2H + P2 - 2$HqP) (8)
Our objective is to check whether the incentive constraint (ICH) is still
respected with the previous menu (cH,cL) since high valuation consumers
are now risk averse. It is indeed the case if:
(9)
The last condition is verified when :
Uh{Ch,$h) - 7 (qh&h + Pli ~ MhQhPh) >
UH{CL^H) - 7 (<7iA + PÎ- 2-ôHqLPL) (10)
(ICH) is binding so we hâve UH(CH\0H) = UH{CL,°dH) and the last con
dition becomes :
(qH42H + Pi - 2dHqHPH) <, (ql^h + PÏ ~ 2âHqLPL) (11)
Using (6), (7), (8) and (9), (12) becomes:
- 3A - 2A2 + 2A^) + DL (2A2 - 1 + A) ^ (1 - \)ÔH {4h ~ 1)
4 Especially for durable goods. If someone watches TV a lot (so he has a high willingness to pay for a TV),
he is probably more risk averse about the break-down of the TV than consumers who don't often watch TV.
5 Where (fc) is such that k' > 0, k" < 0 and k' = ^ =-\]ZI}qw\ = 1 2WDavid Bardey 113
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In a second-order price discrimination model with two types
of consumers, if high valuation agents are more risk averse, whatever the
degree of the risk aversion, and if the seller does not take into account the
risk aversion heterogeneity among consumers, the high valuation agents may
prefer the quality destined to the low ones.
It is very easy to verify that the last condition can be not satisfied
for very realistic values of the parameters. If we take the proportions of
the two consumers types equal to 1/2, ## = 0.6 and #£, = 0.4, we hâve
Vh{cu,-Ôh) < Vh{cl^h)- The more important point of the proposition, is
that this incentive constraint is violated whatever the degree of risk aversion.
If high valuation consumers' degree of risk aversion are infinitésimal, the
second-order price discrimination can be disturbed.
The lower is the value of tiL, the lower the value of -dH has to be to
violate the incentive constraints of high valuation consumers when they are
risk averse. When the proportion of high valuation consumers increases, the
step value of tfw for which VH{cH^h) < Vh{cl,-&h) increases too. It is
due to the fact that for optimal contracts under risk neutrality, ail things
equal, the différence PH - Pi increases with the proportion A of H-type
consumers. According to the fact that for the H-type, the quality is equal
to the taste parameter (i.e qu = $h) and that the price PH is increasing
with êti, when the proportion À increases, the parameter -du (so the quality
sold to the H-type consumers) must be not too high to insure the incentive
constraint, so to avoid that the risk aversion effect linked to the price paid
becomes too strong.
Of course, from a methodological point of view, it can appear usual
that optimal allocations derived in a monodimensional setting are not robust
in a multidimensional framework. However, we guess that the risk aversion
effect generated by the uncertainty dimension of the quality was until then
implicitly neglected because of the wrong intuition that positive corréla
tion between risk aversion and valuation of the quality favors the relaxing
incentive constraints instead of violating them.
Remark 1 In a model which takes into account the heterogeneity of risk
aversion, the paradoxical effect of risk aversion favors bunching allocation.
According to the paradoxical effect of risk aversion, high valuation
consumers may prefer lower quality due to the uncertainty dimension of the
quality.
2.3 Demand for quality and self-protection theory
The consumers' demand for quality and the self-protection theory follow the
same mechanism. Eeckhoudt and Dionne (1985) showed that self-protection114 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(1), 2004
activities may paradoxically decrease when agents are more risk averse.6
Briys-Schlesinger (1990) offered a very intuitive interprétation of this para-
doxical risk aversion effect for self-protection actions that we can apply to
the quality choice problem. If we reason with the final wealth distribution, a
higher quality does not imply a less risky distribution.7 To understand this
phenomenon, imagine you décide to buy an expensive TV in order to reduce
the break down probability of your new télévision set. If unfortunately your
télévision set breaks down anyway, you are in the worst situation : you spent
a lot of money and you hâve no télévision. Surprisingly, this mechanism, now
well known in the self-protection theory, is not amazingly considered in the
quality literature.
3 Conclusion
In this note, we focus on a very usual trade-off made by consumers each
time they buy a durable good : "// / pay more, the break down probability
is reduced\ We study the conséquences of this trade-off on the second-
order price discrimination policy. An intuitive idea is that more risk-averse
consumers will prefer to pay a more expensive price. We explain in this note
that demand for quality corresponds to a similar choice for self-protection
activities and we simply apply the self-protection theory to analyze the
demand for quality specificity. If a consumer pays a higher price but the
good breaks down anyway, he is in the worst situation. This mechanism is
not monotone with risk aversion which implies very strong difficulties to
develop a multidimensional model where consumers are both represented
by their quality valuation and their degree of risk aversion. This work is
a first step and only allows to conclude that risk aversion favors bunching
allocation.
6 See also Eeckhoudt and al. (1997) for an analysis of risk aversion effect on willingness to pay and on
premium risk.
7 To be more spécifie, Briys and Schlesinger (1990) proved that a higher self-protection décision does not
imply a less risky distribution in the second order dominance stochastic.David Bardey 115
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